Opting Out, Collective Contracts and Labour Flexibility: Firm-Level Evidence for The Italian Case

Damiani, Mirella and Pompei, Fabrizio and Ricci, Andrea (2019): Opting Out, Collective Contracts and Labour Flexibility: Firm-Level Evidence for The Italian Case. Forthcoming in: BRITISH JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (December 2019): pp. 1-29.

Abstract

This article analyses the role of deviations from higher level collective agreements adopted in firm-level bargaining to regain higher labour mobility, net positive employment effects and a resurgence of labour productivity. Using Italian firm level data, after performing preliminary pooled ordinary least squares and fixed effects estimates, we adopt a difference-in-difference approach combined with a propensity score matching. All the estimations show that opting out clauses notably increases both hiring and separations, but without significant variations in terms of net employment. In addition, no significant labour productivity gains are obtained. The only significant change concerns the increase in the share of temporary workers.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Opting Out, Collective Bargaining, Labour Flexibility, Difference in Difference
• Subjects: J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining > J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining > J53 - Labor-Management Relations ; Industrial Jurisprudence; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers > J63 - Turnover ; Vacancies ; Layoffs; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J8 - Labor Standards: National and International > J81 - Working Conditions; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J8 - Labor Standards: National and International > J82 - Labor Force Composition

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