Monetary and nonmonetary incentive measures: which work better in the Czech betting firm?

Martin, Pardupa (2010): Monetary and nonmonetary incentive measures: which work better in the Czech betting firm? Forthcoming in: Ekonomicky Casopis No. 10/2010 (2010)

Abstract

In this paper I examine the interrelation between monetary and non monetary incentive measures and the performance of a betting firm in the Czech Republic. Previous studies have focused either solely on monetary measures in order to examine the positive and adverse monetary incentive effects or on measuring the effect of certain non monetary managerial objectives and often on the level of top managers. I argue that the monetary and non monetary incentive measures should be analyzed separately as they influence the final outcome in a methodologically different way and that the analysis on lower level of organization can bring more reliable data. The evidence from unique set of medium term data from the Czech betting firm shows the possible positive effect of increased wage variability on its performance while the effect of trainings and nonmonetary rewards were proven as insignificant.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: monetary incentives, trainings, knowledge dispersion, wage dispersion
• Subjects: J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs > J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials; L - Industrial Organization > L8 - Industry Studies: Services > L81 - Retail and Wholesale Trade ; e-Commerce; M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M5 - Personnel Economics > M53 - Training; M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M5 - Personnel Economics > M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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