Ben said, Hayet (2011): Gestion publique du périmètre irrigué : Accord informel, corruption et recherche de rente.
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Abstract
Abstract The public water management in irrigated perimeter is marked by some failures. We can mention the theft of water, corruption and rent-seeking. These failures result in wastage of this scarce resource. We propose to study the public management of irrigated perimeter using the theory of transaction cost. To this end, we conduct an inquiry in the delegation of "Souk Essebt" in governorate of Jendouba (North West of Tunisia). The qualitative and quantitative information collected is used to describe the functioning of the perimeter. We conduct descriptive and econometric study to verify theoretical hypothesis.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Gestion publique du périmètre irrigué : Accord informel, corruption et recherche de rente |
English Title: | Public management of water in irrigated aera:informal agreement,corruption and rent-seeking |
Language: | French |
Keywords: | public management of irrigated perimeter, transaction cost, theft of water, corruption, rent seeking, transaction cost |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B5 - Current Heterodox Approaches > B52 - Institutional ; Evolutionary A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I2 - Education and Research Institutions > I28 - Government Policy Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation > Q25 - Water |
Item ID: | 34217 |
Depositing User: | Hayet Ben Said |
Date Deposited: | 27 Oct 2011 14:32 |
Last Modified: | 28 Sep 2019 10:32 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/34217 |