Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered

Schmitz, Patrick W. (2012): Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered.

Abstract

A principal wants two sequential tasks to be performed by wealth-constrained agents. Suppose that there is an outcome externality; i.e., a first-stage success can make second-stage effort more or less effective. If the tasks are conflicting, the principal's profit-maximizing way to induce high efforts is to hire one agent to perform both tasks (so that the prospect to get a larger second-stage rent after a first-stage success motivates the agent to work hard in the first stage). In contrast, when there is an effort externality (i.e., first-stage effort reduces or increases the probability of a second-stage success), then the principal prefers to hire two agents whenever the tasks are conflicting.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: moral hazard; limited liability; conflicting tasks; synergies
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory; L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L23 - Organization of Production; M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M1 - Business Administration > M12 - Personnel Management ; Executives; Executive Compensation; M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M5 - Personnel Economics > M54 - Labor Management

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