Diaspora famille transferts et contrat implicite

Jellal, Mohamed (2014): Diaspora famille transferts et contrat implicite.

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a two-period model of migration and remittances as implicit contract in a context of asymmetric information. Our model offers new theoretical findings with respect to the previous literature on the main determinants of remittances. According to self-interest thesis, migrants make transfers in order to insure themselves against the risk of migration return. The low-skilled migrants are more likely to return to home country when informational symmetry is restored, then among others things, their optimal transfers is a decreasing function of the migrant's skill level and increasing function of the family’s wealth level

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Diaspora famille and transfers as implicit cintract
• Language: French
• Keywords: Diaspora, Education, Transfers, Incomplete Information, Implicit Contrat
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory; F - International Economics > F2 - International Factor Movements and International Business > F22 - International Migration; F - International Economics > F2 - International Factor Movements and International Business > F24 - Remittances; I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I2 - Education and Research Institutions > I25 - Education and Economic Development

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