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Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć pierwsza – podstawy teoretyczne

Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć pierwsza – podstawy teoretyczne. Published in: Górnictwo Odkrywkowe (Opencast Mining) , Vol. Vol. X, No. No.1-2 (January 2007): pp. 73-80.

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Abstract

The newest findings in analysis of bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite opencast mine & power plant have been discussed. The determinism of optimal solution not only in quantity of lignite (the size and shape of the ultimate pit) but also in its price has been depicted. It has been proposed to treat negotiation between power plant and mine as a two stage, cooperative, non-zero sum two-person game. In the first stage the ultimate pit maximizing the joint profit of BM would be chosen and in the second during bargaining the split of profit would be decided together with the transfer price of lignite. The differences of strategic and tactical negotiations have been depicted and the needs of frequent adjustments to changing conditions have been stressed. It has been proposed to treat this adjustment as a real option to change scale of activity. The Nash bargaining solution has been proposed as a tool for equitable split of profit in BM and conditions of good solution have been discussed.

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