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Wage bargaining and capital accumulation: A dynamic version of the monopoly union model

Guerrazzi, Marco (2024): Wage bargaining and capital accumulation: A dynamic version of the monopoly union model.

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Abstract

In this paper, I explore the relationship between wage bargaining and capital accumulation by developing a differential game in which a monopolistic union sets the wage of its members by taking as given the optimal employment strategy of a representative firm and the way in which capital is evaluated over time. Under the assumption that investment amounts to a constant share of produced output, I show that a meaningful open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium requires the union to be more patient than the firm. Moreover, relying on some numerical simulations, I show that although adjustments towards the steady-state equilibrium occur through damped oscillations, after an initial period of decline the model predicts a stable union wage premium.

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