Schmitz, Patrick W. (1997): Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information. Published in: Public Finance/Finances Publiques , Vol. 1, No. 52 (1997): pp. 89-101.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2001): The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights. Published in: European Journal of Law and Economics , Vol. 11, No. 1 (2001): pp. 23-28.
Rosenkranz, Stephanie and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2001): Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2003): Unmöglichkeitstheoreme bei asymmetrischer Information. Published in: Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium , Vol. 4, No. 32 (2003): pp. 239-242.
Ewerhart, Christian and Schmitz, Patrick W. (1998): Unvollständige Verträge und die Grenzen der Firma. Published in: Das Wirtschaftsstudium , Vol. 8-9, No. 27 (1998): pp. 880-882.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (1997): Sollten Haftungsregeln durch Strafen ergänzt werden? Published in: Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftswissenschaften , Vol. 48, No. 3 (1997): pp. 351-360.
Schmitz, Patrick W. and Sliwka, Dirk (1998): Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern. Published in: Homo Oeconomicus , Vol. XV, No. 2 (1998): pp. 233-243.
Ewerhart, Christian and Schmitz, Patrick W. (1997): Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge. Published in: Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftswissenschaften , Vol. 48, No. 1 (1997): pp. 57-69.
Ewerhart, Christian and Schmitz, Patrick W. (1997): Der Lock in Effekt und das Hold up Problem. Published in: Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium , Vol. 26, No. 7 (1997): pp. 360-363.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2000): Der Effekt von Nachverhandlungen auf Investitionen mit Eigen- und Fremdwirkung. Published in: Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium , Vol. 29, No. 6 (2000): pp. 328-330.
Ewerhart, Christian and Schmitz, Patrick W. (1996): Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge. Published in: Homo Oeconomicus , Vol. XIII, No. 4 (1996): pp. 501-514.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2000): Book Review of “Inflation and the Enforcement of Contracts” (Renner, 1999). Published in: Journal of Economics/Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie , Vol. 71, No. 3 (2000): pp. 336-338.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2000): Book Review of “On Voting: a public choice approach” (Tullock, 1998). Published in: Constitutional Political Economy , Vol. 11, No. 4 (2000): pp. 381-383.
Rosenkranz, Stephanie and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2002): Book Review of “Bargaining Theory with Applications” (Muthoo, 1999). Published in: Public Choice , Vol. 113, No. 3 (2002): pp. 491-495.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2004): Book Review of “Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict, and Law” (Anderson and McChesney, 2003). Published in: Journal of Economics/Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie , Vol. 81, No. 1 (2004): pp. 87-92.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2006): Book Review of “Contract Theory” (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005). Published in: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , Vol. 162, No. 3 (2006): pp. 535-540.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2002): On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2002): On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2002): Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information.
Rosenkranz, Stephanie and Schmitz, Patrick W. (1999): Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts.
Ewerhart, Christian and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2000): "Yes Men," Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2000): On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2001): The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (1998): On Randomization in Coalition Contracts.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2000): Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered.
Ewerhart, Christian and Schmitz, Patrick W. (1998): Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2010): On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments.
Ohlendorf, Susanne and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2011): Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality.
Schmitz, Patrick W. and Tröger, Thomas (2011): The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2012): Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods.
Hoppe, Eva I. and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2012): Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2012): Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2012): The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability.
Hoppe, Eva I. and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2013): Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2013): Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2013): Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2013): Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered. Published in: Economics Letters , Vol. 121, No. 3 (2013): pp. 533-536.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2013): Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information.
Müller, Daniel and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2016): Vertragstheorie: Zum Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström.
Müller, Daniel and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2017): Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs. Published in: Economics Letters , Vol. 152, (2017): pp. 88-92.
Müller, Daniel and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2016): Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm. Published in: European Economic Review , Vol. 87, (2016): pp. 92-107.
Müller, Daniel and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2015): Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted. Published in: Economics Letters , Vol. 129, (2015): pp. 116-120.
Goldlücke, Susanne and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2018): Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments. Published in: European Economic Review , Vol. 110, (2018): pp. 211-222.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2017): Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives. Published in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , Vol. 144, (2017): pp. 153-165.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2014): Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered. Published in: Economics Letters , Vol. 125, (2014): pp. 21-24.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2016): The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information. Published in: Economics Letters , Vol. 145, (2016): pp. 33-37.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2017): Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm. Published in: Economics Letters , Vol. 159, (2017): pp. 96-99.
Hoppe, Eva I. and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2019): How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects.
Hoppe, Eva I. and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2018): Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory. Published in: Games and Economic Behavior , Vol. 109, (2018): pp. 544-564.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2019): Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership. Published in: Economics Letters , Vol. 183, No. Article 108558 (2019)
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2020): Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm. Published in: Economics Letters , Vol. 186, No. Article 108514 (2020)
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2021): Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information. Published in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , Vol. 182, (2021): pp. 100-112.
Müller, Daniel and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2021): The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract. Published in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , Vol. 184, (2021): pp. 653-669.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2021): On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries. Published in: Economics Letters , Vol. 202, No. 109823 (2021)
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2021): Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information. Published in: Journal of Public Economics , Vol. 198, No. Article 104424 (2021)
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2022): How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts. Published in: Economic Journal , Vol. 132, No. ueac024
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2023): Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction? Published in: Economics Letters , Vol. 224, No. 111012
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2023): Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory. Published in: Economics Letters , Vol. 226, No. 111103 (2023)
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2023): The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts. Published in: European Economic Review , Vol. 157, No. 104511 (2023)
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2024): When Should the Government Own the Physical Assets Needed to Provide Public Goods?
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