Social Choice and Institutionalism

Obregon, Carlos (2023): Social Choice and Institutionalism. Published in:

Abstract

The main thesis in this manuscript is that a social choice theory based on aggregating individual preferences and values is insufficient to confront the social choices that today’s world is facing. It is defended in here that institutions play a critical role in any social choice, and that the solutions required for today’s global problems necessarily require strengthening the international institutions. In part one of the book, it is shown that socio-economic choices can never be only the consequence of aggregating individuals’ preferences + values and that institutions play a decisive role. Part two of the book extends the results of part one to socio-political choices, and it is shown that they also include the critical role of institutions. It is shown that the design of the international institutional arrangement will be critical for the solutions for global poverty, underdevelopment, financial stability, global health issues, global climate, international crime, and global peace.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: social choice, theory, individual preferences, values, institutions, global problems, socio-economic, political choices, poverty, underdevelopment, financial stability, global health, global climate, international crime, global peace
• Subjects: F - International Economics > F0 - General; F - International Economics > F0 - General > F00 - General; F - International Economics > F0 - General > F01 - Global Outlook; F - International Economics > F0 - General > F02 - International Economic Order and Integration; F - International Economics > F2 - International Factor Movements and International Business; F - International Economics > F2 - International Factor Movements and International Business > F20 - General; F - International Economics > F2 - International Factor Movements and International Business > F22 - International Migration; F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance; F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance > F30 - General; F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance > F31 - Foreign Exchange; F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance > F33 - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions; F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance > F36 - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration; F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance > F37 - International Finance Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications; F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F50 - General; F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F51 - International Conflicts ; Negotiations ; Sanctions; F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F53 - International Agreements and Observance ; International Organizations; G - Financial Economics > G0 - General; G - Financial Economics > G0 - General > G00 - General; G - Financial Economics > G0 - General > G01 - Financial Crises; G - Financial Economics > G0 - General > G02 - Behavioral Finance: Underlying Principles; G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets; G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G10 - General; G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G15 - International Financial Markets; G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G19 - Other; G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G20 - General; H - Public Economics > H0 - General > H00 - General; H - Public Economics > H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents > H30 - General; I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I0 - General > I00 - General; I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I1 - Health > I10 - General; I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I1 - Health > I11 - Analysis of Health Care Markets; I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I1 - Health > I12 - Health Behavior; I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I1 - Health > I13 - Health Insurance, Public and Private; I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I1 - Health > I15 - Health and Economic Development; M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M0 - General > M00 - General

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